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ABSTRACT: The use of cloud computing is extending to all kind of systems, including the ones that 
are part of Critical Infrastructures, and measuring the reliability is becoming more difficult. Computing is 
becoming the 5th utility, in part thanks to the use of cloud services. Cloud computing is used now by all types 
of systems and organizations, including critical infrastructure, creating hidden inter-dependencies on both 
public and private cloud models. This paper investigates the use of cloud computing by critical infrastructure 
systems, the reliability and continuity of services risks associated with their use by critical systems. Some 
examples are presented of their use by different critical industries, and even when the use of cloud comput-
ing by such systems is not widely extended, there is a future risk that this paper presents. The concepts of 
macro and micro dependability and the model we introduce are useful for inter-dependency definition and 
for analyzing the resilience of systems that depend on other systems, specifically in the cloud model. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Virtualization and Cloud computing have changed 
the way organizations are using ICT services. 
Cloud services are starting to be used for almost 
all types of organizations including organizations 
that are involved in CI (Critical Infrastructure) 
systems. As with virtualization at the beginning, 
it is been introduced by stages, and starting with 
services that are not part of critical systems. There 
is a long list of reasons for using the cloud model 
as elasticity, mobility, costs and the possibility for 
the organization of focusing on the core business 
and treat the ICT as the 5th Utility. The main risk 
with the use is not what we see, but what we do not 
see, the complexity increase, and new variables are 
introduced, in most cases without the knowledge 
of the organization. Egan (Egan 2007) use the term 
"rafted networks" to describe this type of systems 
that began with simple systems that evolve into 
very complex systems in an unplanned manner. 
The utilization of cloud computing will change the 
current ICT models for most of the industries and 
organizations, including public ones, impacting the 
current systems, the reliability and the risks associ-
ated to these new models. It is considered as well 
that in the next years and due to the number of 
systems both private and public, cloud computing 
facilities will be consider a critical infrastructure, 
and similar protection to other critical infrastruc-
ture systems should be implemented. It should be 
considered the interdependencies for these systems, 
and assess the impact of possible cascade effects. 
This paper exposes these risks; the effects on the 
reliability, and possible solutions for improve 
the visibility of the risks and try to improve the 
reliability. 
At the beginning of the paper some examples are 
presented of the use of cloud computing by criti-
cal infrastructure systems, as well as some of the 
risks related to the reliability of these systems. In 
the next sections, an overview of current proposals 
is presented. In the final sections, a model to repre-
sent the dependencies of these systems is described: 
the model is based in the concepts of macro and 
micro dependability that are explained. These con-
cepts and model do not pretend to replace previ-
ous ones like the coupling and hidden interactions 
defined by Perrow (Perrow 1999), but complement 
them, so both could be applied. As well an exam-
ple is used to illustrate the use of this model and 
possible implementation in case of being used by 
organizations. No distinction is done related to the 
different type of cloud models and architectures, 
but most of the times we will use as examples 
Infrastructure as a Service model, and the Private/ 
Community cloud for micro dependability, and 
Public/Community for Macro Dependability. The 
cloud model concepts are not described here as this 
is not the focus of the paper and there is plenty of 
information in other publications like "A view of 
cloud computing" (Ambrust 2010) or the Security 
Guidance from the CSA (CSA 2009). 
2 EXAMPLES OF CLOUD SERVICES 
IN POTENTIONALY CRITICAL 
SITUATIONS 
Most of the examples of uses of cloud comput-
ing in critical systems are using the Software as a 
Service or Infrastructure as a service model. As has 
been expressed before in most of the cases these 
systems are replacing the 'non-critical' parts of the 
system. The main reasons to move to these tech-
nologies are costs and improved functionality. 
2.1 Cloud offering for SCADA systems 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) system, Distributed Control Systems 
(DCS), and other control systems are found 
in industrial sectors and critical infrastructure. 
These are known under the general term Indus-
trial Control System (ICS). ICS are normally used 
in industries such as electrical, water, oil and gas. 
The reliable operation of infrastructure depends 
on computerized systems and SCADA. In the last 
years different vendors are providing solutions for 
integrate these systems with Web Dashboards that 
live in the cloud. The information of collected by 
these devices can be viewed and controlled from 
different types of devices from different locations. 
An example of an issue with SCADA systems has 
been the problem with the Stuxnet virus (Schneier 
2010). This It is the first discovered worm that spies 
on and reprograms industrial systems. It was spe-
cifically written to attack Supervisory Control And 
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems used to control 
and monitor industrial processes. This particular 
virus is not related to cloud systems, but what will 
be the effect of a virus like this in a service similar 
to the previous example offered by a cloud provider 
where the services are used by multiple tenants? 
2.2 Department of defense rapid access 
computing environment (RACE) 
The pentagon cybersecurity Robert Lentz (Lentz 
2009) presented the benefits of private cloud 
computing for DoD. To meet this, the Defense 
Information Systems Agency (DISA) is trying 
a DoD-managed cloud computing environment 
called RACE, which enables DoD users to access 
virtual services and storage from a Web portal. 
DISA currently manages the IT infrastructure for 
4 million DoD users and operates 14 data centers 
over the world. 
The RACE portal defines this system as: "This 
quick-turn computing solution uses the revolu-
tionary technology of cloud computing to give you 
the platform that you need today, quickly, inexpen-
sively and, most importantly, securely." Currently 
the system as described by the DoD is not used for 
Critical functions of the DoD, but more for new 
test systems (i.e. YouTube for troops and families) 
(Kubic 2008), but this could change soon due to 
the success of the system. 
2.3 Critical Government services in Peru 
IBM and FONAFE (Fondo Nacional de Finan-
ciamiento de la Actividad Empresarial del Estado) 
are working on the creation of a private cloud 
infrastructure for centralizing the IT operations 
of 10 government companies that provide critical 
services like transportation, power utility, postal, 
port shipping in Peru. This will include the con-
solidation of 10 datacentres, using an outsourced 
model based on private cloud. The purpose is to 
reduce costs and improve efficiency. 
2.4 Radio system for emergency services (SaaS) 
The purpose of this system is to allow the fire bri-
gade, police, emergency management and other 
type of public agencies to connect their private 
push-to-talk radio systems to others inside their 
agency and connect as well with other agencies 
that has been authorized previously. These tasks 
are not executed in their local servers and instead 
are moved into shared data centers accessed via the 
Internet. 
There are several benefits described by these 
companies on the use of these infrastructures, for 
these agencies, most of them related to the use 
of Cloud systems. The main benefits are the low 
entry barriers of cost for using these technologies, 
as there is no need of big investment on interoper-
ability infrastructure, as this is changed for a pay-
per-use model. 
2.5 Nasa Nebula IaaS 
Nebula is an open-source cloud computing project 
and service created by NASA (Nebula 2010). It 
was developed to provide an alternative to the 
costly construction of additional data centers used 
by NASA scientists or engineers require additional 
data processing. Nebula as well provides a simpli-
fied way for NASA scientists and researchers to 
share large, complex data sets with external part-
ners and the public. The model is based on the 
open standard "OpenStack" for open source cloud 
computer that follows a similar model to Linux, 
and is based on two key components, OpenStack 
Compute that is software to provision and man-
age large groups of virtual servers, and Open Stack 
Object Storage, for creating redundant, scalable 
object storage using clusters of commodity servers 
to store large quantities of data. 
3 RELIABILITY IN CLOUD SERVICES 
Reliability is defined as the continuity of service, 
or the probability that a system or service remains 
operable for a specific period of time, or the abil-
ity of a system to perform its required functions 
under stated conditions for a specific period of 
time (Sterbenz 2010). And is normally measured in 
terms of the MTTF, or mean time to failure, based 
on data that is accumulated after a long use of the 
systems based on experience on that system. The 
formula used for measure the reliability is defined 
(Dhillon 2003) by: 
R(t) = l - | f(t)a 
Where R(t) is the reliability at time t and f(t) is the 
failure density function. This is used together with 
the reliabilities networks (Dhillon 2003), including 
the series, parallel, series-parallel, parallel-series and 
standby systems. These concepts, which are used for 
all kind of systems for calculating reliability, can be 
used in the model described later in this paper. 
For most of the cloud services the contracts and 
SLAs are defined based on availability, and not 
always based on previous data, but on estimation 
based on the provider's criteria. All the main con-
cerns that apply to use of Internet or networks for 
CIs applies as well to the cloud services, because 
most of them are provided using interconnected 
datacentres over networks and most of cases the 
Internet, as well the access to these systems is 
done over internet. On this paper we will focus in 
the reliability, some pros and cons for each cloud 
model related to reliability are described in table 1, 
but other aspects should be covered in the use 
of cloud services for CIs, especially legal, regula-
tory compliance, response, recovery and security. 
Cloud services are here to stay, and will become 
a new utility, so why not to use it in the same way 
that most of CIs industries use other utilities like 
water or electricity supplies? There are two main 
differences, one is complexity associated with the 
cloud model that his higher that in other models, 
the second is the time that took to these utilities to 
become reliable, as we know it now, and basically 
all of them are now in a very mature stage. Even 
in these cases, for CIs there are systems to improve 
reliability and availability when these utilities fail, 
like electrical generators or water tanks for chemi-
cal plants with continuous processing. 
Table 1. Cloud models and reliability. 
Model Public Community Private 
Pros 
Cons 
Managed External Oraganization/ Organization 
by provider External 
3.1 Private clouds 
In the case of the private clouds, usually the cus-
tomer does the design and control of the solution, 
and can control most of all of the supply chain 
involved in the service. This provides the possibil-
ity as well of implement services that could not 
be provided on other models like specific fail-safe 
or cluster mechanisms, as well as a closer man-
agement of the solution. It is possible as well to 
specify the system in detail and define SLAs for the 
service based on the requirements of the solutions. 
The solution can be tested thoroughly including all 
the components and a detailed business continu-
ity plan can be created (except for geo-redundancy 
requirements). The main disadvantage of this 
model is that is more expensive than the others, 
due to the economies of scale of other models. It is 
true that not always the reliability and availability 
is better, because usually in public or community 
models due to the bigger number of resources to 
serve peaks or DOS attacks. Other issue that can 
affect the reliability in some cases is the lack of 
geo-redundancy in business continuity. 
In general, even if this model in theory could 
provide more reliability and availability due to 
the fact that can be customized, in reality and in 
long term, could not be similar to the redundancy 
or the availability offered by a public cloud pro-
vider. Private cloud models can be used for serv-
ices where the public o community ones cannot 
be used, and as a staged approach to the use of 
other models. Private model is a good candidate 
for CI organizations that would like to use cloud 
services, as the current public services offer solu-
tions for non-critical services or average enterprise 
services. Some vendors, like VMWare with vcloud 
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offerssolutions for IaaS that permit migrate virtu-
alize environments to internal clouds, and in a later 
stage move with minimum changes to a hybrid or 
public cloud. 
3.2 Public clouds 
The main benefits from this model come from the 
economy of scale factor, and the fact that the pool 
is very large. The reliability is high due to the high 
number of hardware resources and the simplifica-
tion of the infrastructure model. The control of 
the infrastructure is done by the vendor, as well as 
the business continuity strategy, that commonly is 
geo-located in different regions/countries. From 
the security and the monitoring point of view, the 
resources dedicated are higher. 
But this homogenous and simplified model that 
improve economies of scale and lower costs, is at 
the same time the main issue now for CI systems, 
mainly for the lack of offer of specific services that 
meet the demanded services. This will change in the 
future and more services will be offered to meet the 
requirements of more critical systems. Other possi-
ble problem is the lack of control in all the stages 
of the supply chain of the service and the fact that 
this could be an attractive target for hackers. The 
SLAs for these services are normally pre-defined by 
the provider, and there are not possibilities for nego-
tiation, doing difficult to agree in specific reliability 
and availability figures needed for CIs. Unlike the 
private or community models where the datacentres 
can be implemented inside the premises of the cus-
tomers, in the public are outside, and the reliability 
of the Internet or wan network needs to be taken 
into account.Other possible issue that could affect 
reliability for public cloud is the reputation fate shar-
ing, where basically the issues with one of the tenants 
could affect to other tenants, an example is the case 
(Joshi 2009) where premises of a datacentre where 
closed and disconnected by the FBI due to investiga-
tion of criminal activities of one of the tenants. 
3.3 Community clouds 
This model is a combination of the two previous 
models, with the benefits and in some cases weak-
nesses of both, limiting the costs due to a low cost 
entry barrier due to the fact that is divided between 
the different consumers, as well give more flexibil-
ity. In community clouds similar requirements of 
similar type of customers are met. This is partic-
ularly important for CI organizations, where the 
public cloud model does not meet the requirements 
and reliability criteria requested by these systems. 
Similar organizations or government agencies can 
use this model for improve reliability and elasticity 
due to the increase in resources, and at the same 
time reduce costs due to the economies of scale. 
The users that can be part of this community cloud 
are restricted and normally well known, reducing 
the risks of having multi-tenancy 
Due to the common requirements and objectives 
the same utilization patterns could appear, reduc-
ing elasticity and flexibility in high peaks. Could 
be a more attractive target for hackers/attackers, 
especially in community clouds for CI systems. 
Changes and improvements to the infrastructure 
and services needs to be agreed by the members, 
and is not always easy to find a consensus. Other 
models like industrial cloud (Wlodarczyk 2009) are 
similar concepts to the community cloud, but with 
specialized collaboration concepts and are not 
described in detail in this paper. 
3.4 Cloud service models 
From the three main cloud models (Software as a 
Service SaaS, Platform as a Service PaaS, Infra-
structure as a ServiceIaaS),SaaS is the one that 
offers less control to the customer, and this is 
linked usually to lack of control of the reliability 
of the system. In the other side, IaaS gives more 
direct control by the customer over the solution 
including the reliability of the system. In the same 
way, the private cloud offers more control of the 
solution to the customer than the community, 
hybrid or public. 
3.5 Threats to reliability in cloud services 
It is important when talking about reliability and 
what can affect differentiate between planned 
downtime and un-planned downtime. One of 
the advantages of using cloud systems is that if 
properly designed and due to the heavily use of 
virtualization the planned downtime is reduced 
to minimum, in some cases with providers offer-
ing 3 nines (99.9% or 8 hours per year). What is 
more important here is the un-planned downtime. 
Table 2 shows some of the recent downtimes by 
main cloud providers (Ambrust 2010). AS it hap-
pened with network providers when they started to 
offer new services, the reliability improves as the 
services mature. This happens because of the expe-
rience acquired by staff and proven processes as 
part of a better governance of the cloud services. 
Part of the reliability is linked to the backup 
strategy of the provider, and the time to restore 
in case of an incidence. Security would be as well 
paramount for reliability. Other aspect is the moni-
toring of the systems components and the systems 
as a whole, specially the proactive monitoring and 
capacity planning. The threats will depend on what 
assets will be moved to the cloud services, if are 
going to be specific processes, or data or functions 
Table 2. Outages in cloud providers. 
Service and Outage Duration Date 
S3 outage: authentication 2 hours 15/2/08 
service overload leading to 
unavailability 
S3 outage: Single bit error lead- 6-8 hours 20/7/08 
ing to gossip protocol blow-up 
AppEngine partial outage: 5 hours 17/6/08 
programming error 
Gmail: site unavailable due to 1.5 hours 14/5/09 
outage in contacts system 
that currently are done by internal processes (CSA 
2009). It helps to do a risk assessment on the relia-
bility for the assets that will be moved to the cloud, 
and the impact of the Critical Infrastructure if the 
reliability is impacted. As described in the previous 
sections, the threats can be different depending of 
the type of cloud that will be used. 
Cloud computing threats that could affect the 
reliability of the service are: 
• Bad use by other tenants, in some cases being 
even hackers or attackers to the target systems. 
It is easy to attack from the inside. As well the 
reputation fate sharing, where issues of one ten-
ant could affect the rest. 
• Use of shared resources/technologies like the 
use of virtualization, one bug could affect to all 
systems even if the Operating systems where are 
running are different. 
• Attractive targets for attackers and hackers due 
to the high number of tenants and importance 
of these services in the case of CIs. 
• Lack of control over all the supply chain of 
components that are part of the service, where 
in some cases even the provider does not have 
control as he is using other services from other 
providers. 
There are some initiatives in order to help to 
minimize the risks and assure reliability for cloud 
environment, like the CSA Guidance, the Com-
mon Assurance Maturity Model (CAMM) or the 
Consensus assessment, but are very focused on the 
security aspects of the cloud services. 
4 PROPOSED MODEL 
The last threat described in the previous section, 
the lack of control over all the complete supply 
chain, has been the base for the proposed model, 
where the dependencies between different parts of 
the cloud services are defined. As organizations 
move more services to the cloud, the impact in 
their internal complexity and in the reliability of 
the systems they are offering to the organization 
itself and their clients will increase. Not always this 
added complexity and associated risks to their reli-
ability are seen. 
4.1 Macro and micro dependability 
When two or more CI systems are interacting, the 
risks of one can propagate to the rest, distributing the 
risks. We have introduced the term micro-dependa-
bility to define this concept; micro-dependability is 
defined in the context of Computer Systems as the 
relations of the Computer systems inside organiza-
tions that could affect on the reliance of the services 
that these deliver. However, most of these systems 
could be part of a bigger system, that can be a Criti-
cal Infrastructure, in some cases these boundaries 
and connections are not clear, and only when real 
problems appear is when the connection of these 
systems as part of the CIs are seen, but sometimes is 
too late, as the disaster is there. So moving to cloud 
systems, as well and in a more subtle way, could 
impact the complexity and the reliability of these 
Critical Infrastructure systems, even when initially 
the change was better for the organization. 
The other term that we have introduced is Macro-
dependability, and is used to refer to how the relia-
bility of a system (including Critical Systems) could 
be affected when changes are done in some parts of 
other Systems. In the case of macro-dependability 
the relations are not inside but within systems of 
other organizations or bigger systems, and how these 
could affect on the reliance of the services that these 
deliver. The main problem with both concepts, but 
specially the second, is that this could be happen-
ing now for companies managing CIs and they will 
not know the risks until probably is too late, as Egan 
described for the rafted networks (Egan 2007). 
We have used similar terms to the ones used in 
economy because the way it works for economy 
for both micro and macro economy, when you do 
changes in something that could affect the econ-
omy of the organization, usually these changes 
affect initially to the organization, but when this 
changes are done by more or in specific (or critical) 
areas could even affect to bigger systems and even 
the society or the economy of bigger areas (region, 
country, world). 
4.2 Entities and interactions 
Ourmodel defines the relations of the entities inside 
organizations with other providers (like cloud serv-
ices). The entities can be providers, consumers, or 
monitoring entities, and an entity can have more 
than one role. Each role has a few characteristics 
that will define how this role operates and the reli-
ability/dependability of that entity for that role. 
The attributes should be simple to describe and to 
allocate a measure that could be validated by the 
monitoring roles of the entities. These monitoring 
roles can be allocated to an external entity that cor-
roborates the previous allocation by the entity. 
An example organization is shown in Figure 1, 
the organization is a community provider that 
has been created between different governmental 
organizations for provide monitoring and authori-
zation services for pharmacovigilance and critical 
trials. In this fictitious example two services pro-
vided by this organization (cloud provider) have 
been created. In the entity are two main services 
that produce services that other organizations can 
use. For example, for the service pharmacovigi-
lance there are two main subservices, AddSafe-
tyReport used for adding new safety reports for an 
adverse reaction of a drug. In this example, there 
are a few attributes that are interesting from the 
reliability and dependability point of view, as well 
as for the monitoring of that service. Other entities 
(organizations) or the same one can consume those 
services. In this example the entity has a consumer 
service that is used for managing the email with 
other providers (like a company that provides mes-
saging services). 
The use of other services of different providers 
is very common, and is using these other services 
where the interdependencies are more difficult to 
control. The use is more normal in a cloud model, 
where services are specialized and are becoming 
more specialized. Email is a good example; cur-
rently there are companies like Messagelabs that 
provide antivirus, antispam scanning or encryption 
ServiceCloudHealthCommunityProvider 
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Figure 1. Example of an entity for a cloud commu-
nity provider with producers, consumers and monitor 
services. 
of email. The consumer organization uses the serv-
ices, and only is interested in a few metrics like avail-
ability, responsiveness and effectiveness, but not in 
parameters like the type of infrastructure that this 
producer organization is using to support the serv-
ices, or where the physical service is located. 
The third type of service for an entity is the 
monitoring service; in this case there is a small 
monitoring service for the web interfaces and for 
email. In this example these two could be used for 
internal (web) or external (email) services, and for 
each monitoring service there are some attributes 
that are monitored. This permits to have informa-
tion that can be used and shared with other moni-
toring services from other organizations in order 
to get information about the reliability of those 
services offered by the provider. This is more use-
ful if the monitoring organization is an external 
independent one. 
4.3 Macro and micro dependability interactions 
Other information that is not shown in figure 1 are 
the relations between the entities (organizations). 
The consumers will connect to producers to use the 
services. This information in shown in the diagrams 
using links between consumers and producers, and 
from the point of view of dependability it is the 
most important. In the previous example only one 
entity is shown, with no interactions between each 
entity services. In reality, there are interactions, as 
well as monitoring, of these services. These inter-
actions and the dependencies between different 
systems of the organization define micro-depend-
ability for that organization. And once that these 
interactions are recorded, it will be simple to track 
dependencies of one service with other, as well as 
to monitor them. 
Continuing with the example of the cloud Com-
munity provider for Pharmacovigilance and clinical 
trials applications, in Figure 2 there is a consumer 
of the services as well. In this case the consumer 
can be an external organization that is acting as 
a consumer of both services of the cloud com-
munity provider. In this example, it is a pharma-
ceutical company that needs to send Safetyreports 
and request Clinical Trial approvals. There are two 
types of interaction or connections between the 
entities, the dotted line that is used for monitoring 
of services and should be indicated the interval for 
monitor, and the continuous lines that are used for 
expressing the real use of services from a consumer 
to a provider. It can be with more detail and we 
can explain other step in the link that will be the 
role of the consumer of the Service cloud com-
munity provider of services of an external cloud 
organization EmailServices, that provides secure 
email services with antispam, virus free and extra 
Figure 2. Example of interactions between one cloud 
producer organization and a cloud consumer. 
mail services that the community provider needs to 
use. These services are consumed from other cloud 
organization because secure email services are not 
the core business of the Pharmacovigilance cloud 
community provider that is specialized on phar-
macovigilance services only. Now, in the diagrams 
we can see the links of the complete supply chain 
for these services that are provided, the attributes 
that are interested from the reliability point of view 
and the values of the monitoring from our point 
of view but from other providers of each of these 
attributes. This information can help to improve 
the risk assessment for the complete supply chain 
for that service. These connections/interactions 
between entities are mainly logical, and according 
to other interdependencies models (Rimaldi, 2004) 
will be "Logical Interdependencies", but others 
like geographic or physical could be added to the 
model. There are other models that can be used, 
like one of the three types of "dependability" mod-
els defined by Boudali (Boudali, 2007), but usually 
to apply them is a very slow process, because must 
be done each time a new provider must be used and 
validated periodically to confirm that are still valid, 
mainly because this information cannot be reused 
very easily between different organizations. 
4.4 Qualitative values for reliability 
In order to get quantitative values for the services 
reliability on the model we can use the reliability 
networks defined (Dhillon 2003) depending of 
the type of service that is offered (series, paral-
lel, series-parallel, parallel-series and standby 
systems). In the example that we are using the 
services that the consumer Pharmaceutical com-
panies use from the "Service Cloud Health Com-
munity Provider" Producer are at the same time 
using the mail services of other producer provid-
ing email with scan services, and only these, if this 
Figure 3. Possible metrics that can be used for the 
attributes. 
fails there is not a parallel Producer, in this case 
we use the series network, where the reliability is 
expressed as R = RlR2R3...Rn. So if the reliability 
of SendAlert is 0.95 and the SendEmail from the 
other provider is as well 0.95, the reliability of that 
function will be 0.8145. 
Other models that could be applied are: 
• Parallel in case of different services used in paral-
lel so the Service will only fail when all the pro-
ducers fail. R = 1 - (1-Rl)(l-R2)(l-R3)...(l-Rn) 
• Series-parallel, where the service is using n active 
sub-services (usually from that organization) in 
parallel. 
• Parallel-series, in this case the service is using n 
other sub-services in parallel. 
• Standby systems, where normally the service is 
using only one service, but there is a backup that 
is used if the main one fails. 
These should be applied first for the services of 
the organization (micro) and later once the values 
are calculated for the micro, use these for include 
other organizations (macro). 
4.5 Attribute metrics 
It is important to define correctly the metrics that 
will be used in order to measure the attributes. These 
could be used as well for create the SLAs that will 
be agreed with the provider and in order to moni-
tor if these SLAs are met. In this paper the metrics 
are focused on the reliability, but others that could 
affect directly or indirectly should be added in a real 
scenario (legal, security...). Some of the possible 
metrics that could be used are listed in Figure 3. 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The proposed model and the concepts are used to 
provide a better understanding of the services that 
would like to be used in a cloud solution, showing 
the dependencies and how these affect the reliabil-
ity of those services. Currently we have presented 
the model to be used on ICT systems and mainly 
cloud solutions, but the model can be adapted for 
other type of ICT systems and even interaction 
with other non-ICT Systems, and the roles of 
producers/consumers and supported/supporting 
Infrastructure with other CIs like the Electric grid 
(Rinaldi2001). 
Before cloud services are adopted by an organi-
zation, interdependencies should be reviewed not 
only for the organization that offers the service but 
also for the other organizations that act as provid-
ers for the one we will use. Once the risks are clear, 
the right cloud service and model can be chosen. 
And whatever solution is chosen, there should be 
plans in case of cloud service unavailability and a 
mechanism should be in place to provide service, 
even if it is a degraded service. 
The model can be improved by using the con-
cept of Web Service Level Agreement defined by 
Keller (Keller 2002) and Patel (Patel 2009), and 
using this in a combination with the U M L tools 
dependability models defined by Boudali (Bou-
dali 2007). As well can be used for bigger systems 
(Macro dependability) that include more than one 
small systems (Micro dependability), with more 
variables like price and security and more than one 
view (ICT, electricity). 
In the near future we plan to work in develop-
ing the model with more detail and test it for a real 
system that could be implemented in the cloud. As 
well describe in more detail how the big cloud serv-
ices are becoming a new critical infrastructure. 
A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S 
Dr. Silva participation is partially funded by the 
D I C O D E project (FP7-ICT-20095257184). 
R E F E R E N C E S 
Alexander Keller, Heiko Ludwig; The WSLA Framework: 
Specifying and Monitoring Service Level Agreements 
for Web Services. JOURNAL OF NETWORK AND 
SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT Volume 11, Number 1. 
57-81. 
Alice Lipowicz. April 2009. Cloud computing moves into 
public safety. Federal computer week.http://fcw.com/ 
articles/2009/04/16/cloud-computing-moving-into-
public-safety-realm. aspx. 
Armbrust M, Stoica I, Zaharia M, Fox A, Griffith R, 
Joseph AD, Katz R, Konwinski A, Lee G, Patterson 
D, Rabkin A. A view of cloud computing. April 2010. 
UC Berkeley Reliable Adaptive Distributed systems 
Laboratory. 
Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents. Princeton University 
Press. 1999. 
Cloud Security Alliance. Security Guidance for Critical 
Areas of Focus in Cloud computing V2.1. December 
2009. http://www.cloudsecurityalliance.org/csaguide. 
pdf. 
Dhillon B.S. Engineering Safety. Series on Industrial & 
Systems Engineering—Vol l.Wold Scientific. 2003. 
ENISA, Jan 2011. Security & Resilience in Governmental 
Clouds.Cloud Security Alliance, 2009. Security Guid-
ance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing 
V2.1. 
Gewndal Le Grand, Michel Riguidel. A global framework 
to enhance critical infrastructure protection. Securing 
Critical Infrastructures. Grenoble, October 2004. 
Hichem Boudali, Boudewijn R. Haverkort, Matthias 
Kuntz, Marielle Stoelinga; Best of Three Worlds: 
Towards Sound Architectural Dependability Models, 
8th International Workshop on Performability Mod-
eling of Computer and Communication Systems 
(PMCCS), September 20-21, 2007, Edinburgh, UK. 
James PG. Sterbenz, David Hutchison, Egemen K. 
Cetinkaya, Abdul Jabbar, Justin P. Rohrer, Marcus 
Sholler, Paul Smith. Resilience and survivability in 
communication networks: Strategies, principles, and 
survey of disciplines. Computer Network 54. 2010. 
Joshi, K.R.; Bunker, G; Jahanian, F ; van Moorsel, A.; 
Weinman, J. Dependability in the Cloud: Challenges 
and Opportunities. IEEE/IFIP International Confer-
ence on Dependable Systems & Networks. July 2009. 
Matthew Jude Egan, 2007. Anticipating Future Vulner-
ability: Defining Characteristics of Incresingly Critical 
Infrastructrue-like Systems. Journal of Contingencies 
and Crisis Management, Vol. 15, No. 1, 4-17. 
NASA Nebula project http://nebula.nasa.gov. 
Rimaldi, S.M. Modeling and Simulating Critical Infra-
structures and Their Interdependencies. Hawaii Inter-
national Conference on Systems Sciences. 2004. 
Rinaldi, S.M.; Peerenboom, J.P.; Kelly, T.K.; Identify-
ing, understanding, and analyzing critical infrastructure 
interdependencies. Air Force Quadrennial Defense 
Review, Washington, DC. Dec 2001. 
Robert F. Lentz. May 2009. U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives Armed Services committee of terrorism, 
unconventional threats & capabilities. http://armed-
services.house.gov/pdfs/TUTC050509/Lentz_Testi-
mony050509.pdf. 
Ted G. Lewis. Critical Infrastructure Protection in Home-
land Security. Defending a networked nation. John 
Wiley & Sons. 2006. 
Tomasz Wiktor Wlodarczyk, Chunning Rong, Kari Anne 
Haa-land Thorsen. Industrial Cloud: Toward Inter-en-
terprise Inte-gration. CloudCom2009. Beijing, China. 
Springer 2009. 
Vincenzo Fioriti, Gregorio D'Agostino, Sandro Bolo-
gna. On Modeling and Measuring Inter-dependencies 
among Critical Infrastructures. Complexity in Engi-
neering. IEEE Computer Society. 2010. 
